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Inside
The past decade of scandals involving Enron,WorldCom, Parmalat and Martha Stewart –and the consequent shareholder mistrust of
board members, traders and investment banks – has
increased awareness of insider trading. There are
many views on insider trading and what to do about
it; but we conclude – after extensive research and
interviews – that insider trading is an insignificant
consideration when comparing the volume of shares
traded and the level of insider knowledge utilised.
The issue is not insider trading, but rather how
traders can become better informed so as to
enhance their trading capacity.
What is insider trading? Generally the term is
understood as the buying and selling of securities
on the basis of non-public, or privileged,
information. Information is material that a
reasonable investor is likely to consider as
significant in making an investment decision,
material that, in turn, may have a substantial
impact on the market price of a company’s
securities. Non-public information refers to
information that has not been disclosed to the
marketplace and investors have not had the
opportunity to consider. To become public,
information must be disseminated so that it is
reasonably available to a broad array of investors.
The disclosure of information by a corporate insider
to a select group (for example, analysts) is not
sufficient to make that information public. We felt a
deeper study was needed to explore the wider
dimensions of insider trading.
The data for this study was collected at three
different sites, the Vienna (VSE), London (LSE) and
New York (NYSE) Stock Exchanges during late
2004 and early to mid-2005. The data was
exclusively qualitative in nature using 54 semi-
structured interviews, each lasting about one hour.
Each of the study participants represented
registered financial institutions.
Grey matters
Our research yielded four findings. The first was
that people define insider trading differently.
Parallel to the contrasting views on insider trading
identified in the literature, the study participants
also offered a range of interpretations of the
subject. Differences of view of insider trading did
not vary according to stock exchange location but by
individual. In sum, each interviewee either viewed
insider trading in a formal (legalistic) or in an
informal way.
Thirty out of the 34 Austrian and British
participants defined insider trading in a formal
manner. Similarly, all 20 US participants initially
defined insider trading in a formal way. A
representative response comes from a VSE
interviewee: “Insiders are people whose job gives
them access to confidential market-sensitive
information; and, if they trade on it, it is insider
trading”. For these interviewees, insider trading is
as easy to perceive as whether a car is exceeding
the speed limit.
Even so, the majority of participants viewed
insider trading as the grey area of finance. For
example, one VSE respondent said: “To be honest,
it is such a grey area you can’t draw a line and say
this is insider trading and this is not. I don’t think
you can define insider trading. If someone wants to
buy shares and does not buy them on account of
insider information, such as bad news, in reality,
although he did not do anything, he is still insider
trading. He used inside information which was only
accessible to a certain number of people, in a
certain position, to not buy shares”.
Others felt that attempting to define insider
trading was a worthless exercise. As a legal
requirement for debate in court, definitions may be
necessary – but the circumstances of a court case
would be impossible to replicate in everyday
working life. As views varied according to source
and type of information and circumstances
surrounding such trades, a contextualist
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interpretation of inside trading became our
focus. In short, we tried to discover what insider
trading means and why it occurs.
The information business 
Our second finding was that insider trading is
endemic to trading itself. According to key studies,
insider information refers to information that is
material but not public. However, the study
respondents disputed such a distinction as they
drew a difference between inside information and
the grapevine, both of which could be an equally
powerful stimulus for trade (or not). Although 
all of the study participants recognised it as illegal
to trade on insider information, most held the 
view that it is impossible to draw a clear line
between these two sources of information. Said one
member of the LSE: “The Stock Exchange lives 
on gossip and information. It is impossible in most
of the cases to get to the source of information,
which would make it easier to classify this info.
Hence it is impossible to decide if it was gossip or
insider information”. 
Equally, the participants questioned whether
obtaining material that was non-public could be
classified as insider information. In their view, the
only relevant, non-public material is that of a
market sensitive nature. But no clear view emerged
concerning what constituted market-sensitive
information. A critical aspect of a professional
market trader’s job is research; if he or she
uncovered information through their own research
endeavour, no matter its source, such information
cannot be seen in the legal sense as insider
information. Consider this statement by a member
of the VSE: “It is my job to investigate. I have to
find out what is going on in the market to make the
right decisions. If I find something out because of
my investigation, no one else, apart from me
knows. I don’t believe that’s insider information –
that is my job”.
Inside motivation 
Our third finding was that those who engage in
insider trading have diverse motivations. Even
though no shared view emerged concerning the
nature of such behaviour, the survey participants
discussed the motivation for pursuing what could be
blatantly agreed as insider trading. Three main
motivators for insider trading emerged: power,
money, and excitement of the deal.
Power was considered as a particularly pertinent
motivator for insider trading by most, if not all. An
LSE member phrased it this way: “These people are
in positions where they have the highest power in a
company. No one is above them. So they think who
can ever get me? I am the boss”.
The majority of respondents considered money as
an equally powerful motivator for insider trading.
For example, an LSE interviewee said, “I would say
a motivator for an insider’s trade is the most natural
human quality, avarice. Especially people who work
in this business, it is all about money, otherwise we
would not do it”.
Although power and money were identified by the
majority of participants as motivators for insider
trading, for certain of the participants the
excitement of the deal emerged as an additional
motivator. An LSE interviewee shared with us that
“ ... insider information in the sense that I define it,
may be rather exciting. People with insider
knowledge, being human beings, quite often want to
boast about how they have access to insider
knowledge secrets”.
Market forces 
Our final finding is that the true impact of insider
trading on market efficiency is great, small, or nil
depending on whom you ask. The minority of
interviewees believed that insider trading has a
positive impact on market efficiency. Their view
emphasised that insider trading maintains the 
real value of the market. One interviewee went
further by stating that information asymmetry 
exists in markets with or without insider trading; 
he therefore questioned why insider trading is
viewed as harmful. A VSE respondent typified
responses in this regard: “I truly believe that
insider trading has a positive impact on market
efficiency simply because of the fact that
information is quicker processed in market price.
Furthermore I think that you always have people
who know more than others.”
However, the majority of study participants
considered that insider trading has a negative effect
on market efficiency. While most agreed that market
price is more realistically determined if insiders
trade, the importance of trust in capital markets and
its effect on efficiency were also emphasised. The
point being made is that insider trading undermines
investor trust that, in turn, harms market efficiency.
Says a VSE member: “I think market efficiency
suffers if insider trading is going on because trust of
shareholders disappears. Let’s take VSE as an
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Insider trading is an insignificant consideration when
comparing the volume of shares traded and the level of
insider knowledge utilised.
example. It was always called the ‘Insider Stock
Exchange’ and if you look at the performance of VSE
at this time you can see that insider trading has a
very negative impact on market efficiency”.
Should you care?
It would be easy to look at our research results, as
well as the past literature on insider trading, and
state, simply, that the practice and punishment of
trading on inside information is relative to time,
place, and the people involved. To be sure, the
contrast of views offered by our study participants
parallels the literature concerning the insider
trading effect on market efficiency, market
confidence and insider trading regulation.
However, in contrast to the literature, the study
participants raise doubt as to the meaning and
definition of insider trading. Distinguishing insider
trading from insider information, the study
participants emphasise that gaining information
through research and through their personal
networks is a key aspect of their job. A clear
distinction between research-gathered information
and insider information does not emerge. The lack
of equitable definition has led most of the study
participants to conclude that the concept of insider
trading exists for political reasons and does little to
remove privileged insiders from trading in markets.
The study participants consider that by creating an
atmosphere of political correctness, western
governments simply look good.
It’s time to ask a fundamental question: Despite
all the attention given, is insider trading really such
a big deal?
Considering the volume and value of shares
traded per day, the study participants and other
commentators concur that the contribution of
insider trading to market distortions is small. One
insider or small groups of insiders are not
considered as driving up share price to the point 
of generating dissonance in the market. Thus,
market performance is viewed as being only
marginally impacted.
Given the market abuse tactics adopted by large
organisations to drive share price artificially in a
certain direction, insider trading, by comparison, has
little effect on the volumes traded. That some
traders know more than others, and that this
information affects their decision making and the
trading behaviour of others should they become privy
to this information, is concluded as factually true. 
However, the significance of that statement is
challenged, as markets are competitive by nature
and, in order to be successful in a competitive
market, one needs to be better informed than other
parties. In order to minimise the mistrust and
suspicion involved in being better informed, we
offer the view that appropriate reward, while
simultaneously making that information transparent,
benefits all. Rather than looking to regulate or limit
the individual who has access to privileged
information, we conclude that attention should now
focus on making more information available rather
than increasing prosecutions. At the end of the day,
which is the bigger problem: the insider trader – or
the large, transnational corporations who have the
capacity to sway markets that, in turn, potentially
harm market efficiency in major ways? 
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